

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-04 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00

OIC-01 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 ACDA-05 ISO-00

CU-02 DODE-00 /075 W

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P R 212115Z OCT 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8304

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4515

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USLOSACLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5842

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, UR

SUBJECT: OCTOBER 18 SPC DISCUSSION ON CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

SUMMARY: OCTOBER 18 SPC DISCUSSION OF CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE FEATURED EXCELLENT UK RESUME OF ISSUES INVOLVED, E.G. TIMING, CONTENT OF CONCESSIONS TO BE SOUGHT IN LINKAGE, TACTICS IN MAKING PROPOSAL TO SOVIETS, ETC. SPC WORKING TOWARD PREPARATION OF A CHAIRMAN'S REPORT LISTING PROS AND CONS OF LINKAGE CONCEPT FOR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION IN NAC. NEXT SPC DISCUSSION WILL BE OCTOBER 25. END SUMMARY

1. SPC CHAIRMAN KASTL OPENED OCTOBER 18 MEETING WITH EXPRESSION OF THANKS ON BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE FOR HOSPITALITY AND BRIEFINGS IT RECEIVED IN U.S. KASTL WILL DRAFT APPROPRIATE LETTERS TO WASHINGTON HOSTS AND TO ADMIRAL COUSINS.

2. IN PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION OF "REVERSE" CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE, KASTL CONFIDENTIAL

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SUGGESTED THAT SPC WORK TOWARD A CHAIRMAN'S REPORT TO IDENTIFY PROS AND CONS. THE REPORT WOULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT NAC DISCUSSION.

3. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, DANISH REP (VILLADSEN) AGREED WITH THE PREPARATION OF A CHAIRMAN'S REPORT. ON TIMING, HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD EARLIER PROPOSED PRIORITY PACING FOR THE STUDY EFFORT, BUT IN WASHINGTON THE SPC HAD HEARD THAT THE U.S. SAW NO NEED FOR UNDUE HASTE. VILLADSEN SUGGESTED THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN GENEVA COULD OVERTAKE LINKAGE DISCUSSIONS IN THE ALLIANCE. HE ADDED THAT IN WASHINGTON U.S. SPOKESMAN HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT PROPOSING THAT THE WEST SACRIFICE ITS DESIDERATA IN CSCE BASKET III IN ORDER TO GAIN SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN MBFR. THEREFORE, PACE OF CSCE WOULD BE PRINCIPLE WESTERN LEVERAGE WITH SOVIETS. VILLADSEN NOTED THE WEST COULD OFFER TO SPEED UP THE PACE OF CSCE, BUT IT IS NOT THE WEST THAT HAS CAUSED DELAYS. THE WEST COULD ALSO ACCELERATE THE PACE BY SACRIFICING ITS DEMANDS, BUT IF, AS RECENT REPORTS INDICATE, UNIFIED WESTERN POSTURE HAS BEGUN TO PAY OFF THERE MAY BE NO NEED TO GIVE UP WESTERN GOALS TO GAIN FURTHER SOVIET CONCESSIONS, ADDITIONALLY, NATO'S ATTEMPT TO USE CSCE TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS IN MBFR MIGHT IRRITATE THE NEUTRALS. QUESTION ALSO ARISES OF HOW A LINKAGE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE SOVIETS, I.E., THROUGH NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE, DURING NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, OR BY SOME OTHER MEANS. VILLADSEN RECALLED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT ALWAYS HONORED AGREEMENTS IN PAST, AND IT MIGHT NOT BE WISE TO EXPECT THEM TO LIVE UP TO ANY PROMISES MADE ON MBFR IN A LINKAGE ARRANGEMENT ONCE CSCE HAD BEEN CONCLUDED.

4. LOGAN (UK) SAID HMG WELCOMED THE STUDY PROPOSAL. THE FACT THAT IT HAD COME FROM THE U.S. INDICATED AN OPEN MIND PRIOR TO ANY FIRM NATIONAL DECISION. THIS WAS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF PRE-DECISION CONSULTATIONS. UK REP TRACED HISTORY OF EARLIER MBFR/CSCE LINKAGE. HE NOTED THAT AFTER CSCE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED, SOVIETS HAD TRIED TO RENEGE BY ATTEMPTING TO FIX A FIRM CLOSING DATE FOR CSCE TO FORCE THE WEST TO CONCLUDE CSCE WHETHER OR NOT SOVIETS HAD MADE ANY MEANINGFUL CONCESSIONS IN MBFR. PERHAPS GROMYKO'S REMARKS TO THE SECRETARY SHOULD BE SEEN AS A NEW SOVIET ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH LINKAGE IT HAD UNSECCESSFULLY ATTEMPTED EARLIER. U.S. SUGGESTION FOR REVERSE LINKAGE MIGHT BE USEFUL, HOWEVER, AND MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE HAVE FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO LINKAGE.

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5. LOGAN IDENTIFIED THREE GENERAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN EXERTING LEVERAGE THROUGH LINKAGE:

A) CSCE AND MBFR ARE IN DIFFERENT TIME SCALES. THE PROBLEM, THEREFORE, WAS TO HOLD THE SOVIETS TO ANY PART OF THE BARGAIN THEY MIGHT MAKE ON MBFR IN EXCHANGE FOR WESTERN CONCESSIONS IN CSCE. THE GENEVA TALKS ARE NOW SCHEDULED TO END BEFORE THOSE IN VIENNA, AND THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO OFFER CONCESSIONS IN MBFR BUT RENEGE ON THEM AFTER CSCE HAD CONCLUDED;

B) THERE IS A MULTIPLICITY OF INTEREST WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE TOO EASY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE WEST WAS SOLELY INTERESTED IN MBFR AND THE EAST IN CSCE.

BOTH SIDES ARE INTERESTED IN ELEMENTS OF BOTH NEGOTIATIONS;

C) THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE IN PARTICIPATION IN THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS WITH NEARLY TWICE AS MANY COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN CSCE AS IN MBFR. JUST AS THE NUMBERS OF PARTICIPANTS VARY, SO DO THEIR INTERESTS. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT THE U.S. IS LESS INTERESTED THAN THE EUROPEANS IN CSCE, AND THIS PROVIDES THEM WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEMPT DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES. THUS ANY STRATEGY DEvised TO EXERT LEVERAGE MUST PUT THE U.S. AS THE MAIN WEIGHT ON THE LEVER. SUCH LEVERAGE MUST ALSO BE EXERTED ON THE SOVIETS WHERE THEY ARE MOST VULNERABLE AND IN AREAS OF THEIR MAJOR DEMANDS. THE PRINCIPAL CSCE LEVERAGE REMAINING TO THE WEST IS THE ATTENDANCE OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AT A CONCLUDING SUMMIT MEETING. THIS LEVERAGE COULD BE MOST EFFECTIVELY EXERTED, THEREFORE, IF THE U.S. WERE TO INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS, PERHAPS BILATERALLY, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION IN HELSINKI WOULD DEPEND ON SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN MBFR.

6. LOGAN POINTED OUT THAT IF THE SOVIETS FAIL TO RESPOND TO SUCH LEVERAGE THERE COULD BE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES NOT ONLY FOR SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS NOW IN TRAIN BUT FOR DETENTE IN GENERAL. MOREOVER, NEUTRALS AND OTHERS MIGHT BE UNHAPPY IF CSCE DID NOT END IN A SUMMIT MEETING. THE PROBLEM ALSO REMAINED OF HOW WEST COULD JUDGE WHAT MINIMUM MBFR CONCESSIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED OF THE SOVIETS. WOULD A LIST BE DRAWN UP IN ADVANCE  
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AND PROPOSED TO THE SOVIETS OR WOULD THE ALLIES WAIT TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT AFTER A SERIES OF SOVIET CONCESSIONS HAD BEEN MADE? MOREOVER, HOW WOULD THE WEST DECIDE WHAT TO CONCEDE IN CSCE? ADDITIONALLY, ALLIED PUBLICS MIGHT NOT UNDERSTAND WESTERN UNWILLINGNESS TO CONCLUDE CSCE WERE SOVIETS TO APPEAR FORTHCOMING IN GENEVA BUT HAD NOT MET WESTERN CRITERIA FOR CONCESSIONS IN MBFR.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-04 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00

OIC-01 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8305  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4516  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
USLOSACLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5842

7. NORWIGIAN REP (SELMER) SAID OSLO SAW PROBLEMS IN SAME WAY AS CITED BY LOGAN. ALTHOUGH NORWAY AGREED THAT THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONNECTED WITH EACH OTHER, AS NATO COMMUNIQUE HAD INDICATED, IT STILL HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT EXPRESSING ANY FORMAL LINKAGE. SELMER POINTED OUT DIFFICULTIES IF IT BECAME PUBLIC THAT NATO HAD STUDIED AND REJECTED IDEA OF LINKAGE SINCE THIS WOULD REMOVE A POSSIBLE WESTERN BARGAINING ASSET.

8. BOSS (FRG), ON INSTRUCTIONS, WELCOMED THE U.S. STUDY INITIATIVE AND SAID BONN'S THOUGHTS RAN IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THOSE EXPRESSED BY DANISH AND UK REPS. ON BASIS OF THEIR STUDY OF THE ISSUES, GERMANS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE RISKS IN LINKAGE WERE GREATER THAN THE ADVANTAGES, I.E. IT WOULD PROMPT HIGHER SOVIET DEMANDS FOR WESTERN CONCESSIONS IN GENEVA, WOULD FOSTER NEUTRAL

RESENTMENT, AND WOULD RAISE POSSIBLY DIVISIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT MBFR CONCESSIONS TO BE SOUGHT FROM THE SOVIETS. BONN REALIZED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE INDIRECTLY LINKED AND THAT THERE MUST BE SOME REACTION TO THE LINKAGE CONCEPT EXPRESSED BY GROMYKO.  
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ALLIES SHOULD COUNTER ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH LINKAGE IN SOVIETS' FAVOR THROUGH CONCERTED BILATERAL STEPS IN MOSCOW WITH THE U.S. TAKING THE LEAD WITH THE SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES. BOSS SUGGESTED THE SECRETARY'S MOSCOW TRIP MIGHT PROVIDE FIRST OCCASION FOR SUCH STEPS.

9. BELGIAN REP (BAL) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WAS STUDYING THE ISSUE, BUT HE BELIEVED BRUSSELS WOULD BE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED BY UK AND DENMARK. HE HOPED ALLIES WOULD STUDY ANY EAST-WEST BILATERAL APPROACHES IN ADVANCE IN DETAIL.

10. CANADIAN REP (ROY) SAID THAT OTTAWA WAS STILL STUDYING U.S. SUGGESTION. HE IDENTIFIED TWO ESSENTIAL ITEMS FOR CONSIDERATION: THE ALLIES MUST BE CERTAIN(A) THAT THE SOVIETS REALLY WANT AN EARLY CSCE CONCLUSION, AND (B) THAT THE WEST ITSELF WAS READY TO PROLONG DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA. BECAUSE OF SAME PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY UK, CANADA HAS DOUBTS ABOUT LINKAGE BUT AGREED THAT IT BE STUDIED AND KEPT IN MIND FOR POSSIBLE LATER USE.

11. BUWALDA (NETHERLANDS) SAID THE HAGUE WAS IN VERY CLOSE AGREEMENT WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED BY UK. IT WAS DUTCH VIEW THAT THE WEST WAS THE DEMANDEUR IN BOTH GENEVA AND VIENNA AND IT REALLY HAD LITTLE MORE TO CONCEDE AT GENEVA BUT ITS AGREEMENT TO GO TO A SUMMIT MEETING. ONCE THE WEST PLAYED THE SUMMIT CARD, IT WOULD HAVE NO ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE SHOULD THE SOVIETS FAIL TO MEET THEIR PART OF THE BARGAIN IN MBFR.

12. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, TURKISH REP (TULUMEN) ALSO AGREED WITH UK REP'S RECITATION OF THE ISSUES AND POINTED OUT THAT IF THERE WERE NO SUMMIT CONCLUSION TO TERMINATE THE CSCE, THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL INSIST MORE CREDIBLY ON A CSCE FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENT.

13. ITALIAN REP (SPINELLI) SAID ROME STILL HAD LINKAGE MATTER UNDER STUDY, BUT INVITED ALLIES TO BE CAREFUL THAT ANY DECISION THEY MAKE NOT HAVE ADVERSE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINIONS.

14. U.S. REP (PEREZ) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR EXCELLENT OPEN AND FRANK DISCUSSION IN RESPONSE TO U.S. INITIATIVE, AND AGREED THAT A CHAIRMAN'S REPORT MIGHT BE TARGET TOWARD WHICH SPC SHOULD WORK.

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15. IN CLOSING, KASTL SUGGESTED THAT IS WOULD BEGIN DRAFTING A WORKING PAPER IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES.

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